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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Is Salt Lake County immune from suit by plaintiff in 
this action under the provisions of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act? 
II. Do the actions of Salt Lake County alleged by plain-
tiff constitute inverse condemnation, and if so, is plaintiff's 
claim based upon the theory of inverse condemnation actionable 
under Utah law? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Title 63, Chapter 30, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
states in pertinent part: 
(Section 63-30-3) . . . 
The management of flood waters and other 
natural disasters and the construction, 
repair, and operation of flood and storm 
systems by governmental entities are 
considered to be governmental functions, 
and governmental entities and their offi-
cers and employees are immune from suit for 
any injury or damage resulting from those 
activities. 
[Section 63-30-10(1)] . . . 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope of his 
employment except if the injury: 
(a) arises out of the exercise or 
performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function, whether 
or not the discretion is abused, or... 
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Title 17. Chapter 8. Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
states in pertinent part: 
(Section 17-8-5) . . . 
In anticipation of and to provide for 
the carrying away and the safe disposal of 
natural storm and flood waters, the board 
of county commissioners may remove any 
obstacle from any natural channels within 
the county and the incorporated municipali-
ties within the county. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent is dissatisfied with the statement of the case 
set forth in appellant's brief and pursuant to Rule 24(b) 
U.R.A.P. elects to make its own statement of the case as 
follows: 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an action brought by plaintiff against Salt Lake 
County seeking to recover damages based upon his allegations 
that employees of Salt Lake County intentionally and/or 
negligently damaged plaintiff's real and personal property 
located in or near the streambed of Big Cottonwood Creek while 
engaged in the work of altering and improving the streambed as 
part of Salt Lake County's flood control program. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
1. Plaintiff filed his complaint in the Third Judicial 
District Court on May 14, 1985, alleging that Salt Lake County 
employees had intentionally and/or negligently damaged his 
property. (R. 2-11). 
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2. Salt Lake County responded by filing a motion to 
dismiss and supporting memorandum asserting plaintiff's failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (R. 
12-44). A hearing on the motion to dismiss was set for 
September 10. 1985 before the Honorable Dean E. Conder, 
District Judge. (R. 45). 
3. On September 9, 1985, plaintiff filed a memorandum in 
opposition to the motion to dismiss (R. 48-63) and also filed 
an amended complaint seeking the same damages under a second 
cause of action based upon a theory of inverse condemnation. 
(R. 64-67). 
4. Pursuant to the hearing on the motion to dismiss held 
on September 10, 1985, Judge Conder granted the motion to 
dismiss as to plaintiff's first cause of action but made no 
ruling as to the second cause of action. (R. 68, 81-82). 
5. Thereafter, Salt Lake County filed a motion to dismiss 
and supporting memorandum asserting plaintiff's failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to the second 
cause of action alleged in plaintiff's amended complaint. (R. 
72-80). A hearing on the motion was set for October 22, 1985 
before Judge Conder (R. 87), and plaintiff filed a memorandum 
in opposition to the motion on October 11, 1985. (R. 89-97). 
6. Pursuant to the hearing on the second motion to 
dismiss held on October 22, 1985, Judge Conder granted the 
motion to dismiss as to plaintiff's second cause of action. 
(R. 98-100). 
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7. Plaintiff then filed his notice of appeal and appeal 
bond on November 27. 1985. (R. 102-105). 
C. Disposition in the Court Below 
The Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable Dean E. 
Conder. presiding. granted Salt Lake County's motions to 
dismiss as to both causes of action alleged in plaintiff's 
original and amended complaints. (R. 81-82, 99-100). 
D. Statement of Facts 
1. Plaintiff alleges that beginning in May and continuing 
into the summer of 1984. Salt Lake County was engaged in the 
work of altering and improving the streambed of Big Cottonwood 
Canyon as part of its flood control program. (R. 2). 
2. Part of the work was done on a portion of the stream-
bed which crosses over, or is in close proximity to. real 
property owned by plaintiff. (R. 2-3). 
3. During the course of the modifications to the stream-
bed, plaintiff alleges that Salt Lake County, through its 
employees and agents, destroyed and removed two bridges, a 
paved drive path, landscaping, and streambed and bank improve-
ments. (R. 3-4). 
4. The above damages are alleged to have occurred as a 
direct result of the planned and intentional acts of Salt Lake 
County, its agents and employees. (R. 4). 
5. Both the complaint and amended complaint also allege 
additional damages sustained as a result of subsequent flooding 
to plaintiff's property proximately caused by Salt Lake 
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County's negligence. (R. 4 and 64). However, on appeal plain-
tiff states that he no longer makes any claim for compensation 
for these losses sustained as a result of flooding because: 
(1) those damages were miniscule and (2) the County would 
probably be immune. (Appellant's brief, pp. 4-5). 
6. Salt Lake County has admitted removing the bridges and 
other materials from the streambed for the purpose of control-
ling flooding in the Salt Lake Valley during the spring of 1984 
(R. 14-15, 74-75). 
7. In its answer to the amended complaint. Salt Lake 
County has asserted as defenses failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted, contributory negligence on the 
part of the plaintiff or other third persons, immunity under 
the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, and 
plaintiff's failure to mitigate damages. (R. 69-71). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Salt Lake County is immune from suit for the actions 
alleged in plaintiff's amended complaint. The clear and 
unambiguous language of Section 63-30-3 of the Utah Govern-
mental Immunity Act reveals the legislature's intent to grant 
explicit immunity from suit to governmental entities for any 
injury or damage resulting from the management of flood waters 
and the construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm 
systems. The actions of Salt Lake County in removing obstacles 
from the natural channel of Big Cottonwood Creek are authorized 
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by statute and clearly fall within the meaning of the language 
used in Section 63-30-3. 
The provisions of Section 63-30-10 of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act also provide immunity to Salt Lake County from 
suit in this action. The County's actions were taken pursuant 
to the discretionary authority granted by Section 17-8-5, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953. as amended, and constitute the exercise 
and performance of a discretionary function for which immunity 
from suit is not waived under the Act. 
Plaintiff's failure to file an undertaking as required by 
Section 63-30-19 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act also 
constitutes proper grounds for dismissal of this action. The 
filing of an undertaking is a mandatory procedural requirement 
under the Act and plaintiff's failure to comply with this 
prerequisite in pursuing his claim bars his maintaining this 
action against Salt Lake County. 
Plaintiff's claim for inverse condemnation fails to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted under Utah law. This 
Court has consistently and historically held that Article I. 
Section 22 of the Utah Constitution is not self-executing and 
does not establish a cause of action. This Court has also 
consistently held that there has been no waiver of immunity for 
inverse condemnation claims under the provisions of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
The lower court correctly determined that Salt Lake County 
is immune from suit in this action under the provisions of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act and the applicable case law 
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established by this Court. The two orders entered by the lower 
court dismissing this action should therefore be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT SALT LAKE COUNTY IS IMMUNE FROM SUIT 
FOR THE ACTIONS ALLEGED IN PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED 
COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO THE EXPLICIT GRANT OF 
IMMUNITY SET FORTH IN SECTION 63-30-3 OF THE 
UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
Salt Lake County is a legal subdivision of the State of 
Utah. Article XI, Section 1, Constitution of Utah. As such, 
it is a body corporate and politic having powers related to 
that status. Section 17-4-1. Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended. Salt Lake County is both a "political subdivision" 
and "governmental entity" as those terms are defined for 
purposes of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Section 
63-30-2(2) and (3). Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
The first paragraph of Section 63-30-3 provides: 
. Immunity of governmental entities from 
suit. Except as may be otherwise provided 
in this chapter, all governmental entities 
are immune from suit for any injury which 
results from the exercise of a governmental 
function. . . . 
In 1984. the Utah Legislature amended Section 63-30-3 by 
the addition of the following provision: 
The management of flood waters and the 
construction. repair. and operation of 
flood and storm systems by governmental 
entities are considered to be governmental 
functions, and governmental entities and 
their officers and employees are immune 
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from suit for any injury or damage 
resulting from those activities, [emphasis 
addedj. 
Thus, the Utah Legislature has resolved in the affirmative 
any question as to: (1) Whether the management of flood waters 
and the construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm 
systems by governmental entities are governmental functions; 
and. (2) Whether governmental entities are immune from suit for 
any injury or damage resulting from those activities. 
The 1984 amendment to Section 63-30-3 clearly manifests the 
legislature's intent that the management of flood waters and 
the construction, operation, and repair of flood and storm 
water systems are governmental functions for which complete 
immunity from suit is preserved. The amendment gives statutory 
expression to the common law principle that the sovereign has 
full immunity from suit for the management of flood waters. 
See Wilkinson v. State. 42 Utah 483. 134 Pac. 626 (1913). 
' The effective date of the above amendment was March 29. 
1984. Thus. its provisions clearly apply to the actions 
alleged in plaintiff's complaint. (In 1985. the legislature 
further amended Section 63-30-3 by adding the phrase "and other 
natural disasters" following "the management of flood waters"). 
When applied to the facts of the present case, it is clear 
that the provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act cited 
above grant explicit immunity from suit to Salt Lake County for 
the actions alleged in plaintiff's complaint. 
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In reviewing a dismissal of a complaint for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court is 
required to accept the plaintiff's description of facts alleged 
in the complaint to be true. See Hurst v. Highway Department. 
167 U.2d 153. 397 P.2d 71 (1964). Under facts alleged in his 
complaint, plaintiff acknowledges that the injuries he alleges 
resulted from the activities of Salt Lake County beginning in 
May of 1984 while the County was "engaged in the work of 
altering and improving the stream bed of Big Cottonwood 
canyon....as part of its flood control program." [emphasis 
added]. (R. 2. paragraph 3). 
Plaintiff argues in his brief, however, that the actions 
taken by Salt Lake County do not fall within the scope of 
Section 63-30-3. Plaintiff contends that, first, flood waters 
were not being managed, and second, "the actions were not taken 
or conducted in connection with the '...construction, repair, 
and operation of flood and storm systems....'" Appellant's 
brief, p. 9. 
As to the first contention. it is clear from the 
allegations in plaintiff's complaint that the actions of Salt 
Lake County were part of its flood control program and 
consisted of efforts by the County to correct and prevent 
anticipated flooding in the area of plaintiff's property and 
also downstream. See paragraphs 3 and 9 of plaintiff's 
complaint (R. 2 and 4). Salt Lake County submits that actions 
taken for the purpose of preventing anticipated flooding fall 
within the meaning of the phrase "management of flood waters" 
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for purposes of the statute. A county should not have to wait 
until an actual flood is well under way before taking any 
action to prevent the disastrous effects of the flood. But 
even if they do not fall within the meaning of this first 
phrase, such actions clearly fall within the meaning of the 
second phrase as activities involving "the construction, 
repair, and operation of flood and storm systems." 
Plaintiff's contention as to the inapplicability of this 
second phrase is based wholly upon the premise that "the Big 
Cottonwood stream bed is a naturally existing water carrying 
system, and thus does not constitute a flood or storm system as 
contemplated under the statute." Appellant's brief, p. 9. 
However, this premise is false, as shown by the following 
legislative enactments. 
The Utah Legislature has specifically recognized that 
natural channels of rivers, streams, and canals within the 
state are subject to the protection of and use by counties for 
flood control purposes. Section 17-8-1, et seg., Utah Code 
Annotated 19853. as amended. Section 17-8-5.5 provides: 
The board of county commissioners may 
also provide by ordinance for the protec-
tion and use of flood channels and present 
flood plains on rivers, streams, and canals 
located within the county and the incorpo-
rated municipalities in the county and may 
establish by ordinance the boundaries of 
these flood channels and present flood 
plains. 
Pursuant to this section. Salt Lake County has by ordinance 
specifically designated and established Big Cottonwood Creek as 
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part of the county's storm drainage and flood control system. 
Section 7-2-5. Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County 1966, as 
amended. (See Addendum). 
Section 17-8-5. Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, gives 
counties express authority to remove obstacles from natural 
channels: 
In anticipation of and to provide for 
the carrying away and the safe disposal of 
natural storm and flood waters, the board 
of county commissioners may remove any 
obstacle from any natural channels within 
the county and the incorporated municipali-
ties in the county. 
In May of 1984, Salt Lake County was engaged in the work of 
improving the streambed of Big Cottonwood Creek. The County 
admitted in the lower court that its work included the removal 
of various materials, including some bridges, from the stream 
channel. In so doing. Salt Lake County's actions were not only 
within the above statutory authority for removing obstacles 
from natural channels "in anticipation of and to provide for 
the carrying away and safe disposal of natural storm and flood 
waters," but were also within the scope of the "construction, 
repair, and operation of flood and storm systems" as that 
phrase is used in Section 63-30-3. 
The right of counties to remove obstacles from natural 
channels is based upon reasons of public safety. This right 
should reasonably extend to landscaping, bridges, and any other 
structures placed within the channels which may block the 
channels or otherwise threaten the safety and property of 
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county residents living downstream. Persons who obstruct flood 
channels must be willing to assume some risk that the obstruc-
tions may be removed by counties having legal authorization to 
keep flood and storm systems clear. 
Plaintiff also argues in his brief that the phrase 
"management of flood waters" contained in Section 63-30-3 is 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The only authority 
cited in support of this argument is 16C C.J.S. Constitutional 
Law, Sec. 974. Although plaintiff quotes two general 
statements from C.J.S. which appear to lend credibility to his 
argument, a more careful reading indicates that the doctrines 
of both vagueness and overbreadth are not applicable to the 
statute in question. 
First, the doctrine of constitutional overbreadth "applies 
to statutes or regulations that sweep unnecessarily broadly and 
thereby substantially impinge on constitutionally protected 
conduct as well as conduct subject to governmental regula-
tion." 16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law. Sec. 974. p. 284. The 
key word is "conduct." The doctrine of overbreadth applies 
only to statutes or regulations which substantially affect an 
individual's "constitutionally protected conduct" or other 
"conduct subject to governmental regulation." See also 73 
Am.Jur.2d Statutes. Section 346. Plaintiff has not alleged any 
conduct on his part, constitutionally protected or otherwise, 
which would justify the application of the doctrine of over-
breadth to the statute in question. Indeed, Section 63-30-3 
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cannot be found to substantially interfere with any constitu-
tionally protected conduct. Its purpose and effect is not to 
regulate conduct at all. but only to either preserve or waive 
the principle of sovereign immunity as the legislature deems 
appropriate. 
Second, the doctrine of constitutional vagueness is also 
inapplicable to Section 63-30-3. The constitutional 
requirement of due process: 
...requires that a statute be not so vague 
that persons of common or ordinary intelli-
gence must necessarily guess as to its 
meaning, and that it provides adequate 
notice of what conduct it requires or pro-
scribes so that a person of ordinary intel-
ligence is given a reasonable opportunity 
to know what is prohibited." [16C C.J.S. 
Constitutional Law. Sec. 974. pp. 283-4]. 
[emphasis added]. 
See also 16A Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law, Sec. 818. 
The language of Section 63-30-3 neither requires nor 
prohibits any conduct on the part of the plaintiff in this 
case. In the absence of any allegation to that effect by the 
plaintiff, he cannot attack the statute on grounds of 
vagueness. Salt Lake County submits that the language in 
Section 63-30-3 is a clear and unambiguous statement of the 
legislature's intent. But even if the language used by the 
legislature is considered to be vague, it does not auto-
matically follow that the statute is unconstitutional. A 
statute is not unconstitutionally vague merely because clearer 
and more precise language might have been used. See 16A 
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Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law, Sec, 818. p. 989. Any uncer-
tainty or indef initeness can be dealt with by this Court by 
construing the language to give effect to the legislature's 
intent. This Court has held that the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act is to be strictly applied to preserve sovereign 
immunity and to waive it only as clearly expressed therein. 
Holt v. Utah State Road Coram., 30 U.2d 4. 511 P.2d 1286 (1973). 
For the above reasons. Section 63-30-3 cannot be found to 
be unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. 
Plaintiff next argues that even if the statute is constitu-
tional, the intent of the legislature must control. Salt Lake 
County agrees. The County also agrees with the statement set 
forth on page 7 of appellant's brief that in interpreting a 
statute it is the court's primary responsibility to give effect 
to the intent of the legislature, citing American Coal Co. v. 
Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1 (Utah 1984). It is difficult to imagine 
how the legislature could have made its intent any more clear 
than they did. 
In enacting the 1984 amendment to Section 63-30-3, the Utah 
Legislature was responding to the severe flood problems which 
began in the spring of 1983. and which caused Governor Matheson 
to declare a state of emergency. The State of Utah and its 
political subdivisions then responded by commencing extra-
ordinary efforts to prevent flood damage and ensure the public 
safety. The language used by the legislature in Section 
63-30-3 could not be any more certain and unambiguous. The 
intent is clearly to preserve sovereign immunity from suit for 
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any injury or damage resulting from the management of flood 
waters and the construction, repair, and operation of flood and 
storm systems by governmental entities. 
In summary. Salt Lake County is immune from suit for the 
actions alleged in plaintiff's amended complaint. The clear 
and unambiguous language of Section 63-30-3 of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act reveals the legislature's intent to 
grant explicit immunity from suit to governmental entities for 
any injury or damage resulting from the management of flood 
waters and the construction, repair, and operation of flood and 
storm systems. The actions of Salt Lake County in removing 
obstacles from the natural channel of Big Cottonwood Creek are 
authorized by statute and clearly fall within the meaning of 
the language used in Section 63-30-3. Accordingly, plaintiff's 
amended complaint was properly dismissed by the lower court. 
II. IMMUNITY FROM SUIT IN THIS CASE HAS NOT BEEN 
WAIVED UNDER SECTION 63-30-10. 
Plaintiff contends that Salt Lake County's immunity from 
suit in this action has been waived under the provisions of 
Section 63-30-10. Defendant's response is twofold. First, the 
legislature's specific grant of immunity contained in Section 
63-30-3 for flood control activities supersedes the general 
waiver of immunity contained in Section 63-30-10. Second, even 
if Section 63-30-10 applies to this case. Salt Lake County is 
still immune from suit under the discretionary function 
exception. 
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Section 63-30-10 generally waives immunity for injury 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee of a 
governmental entity. However, this waiver of immunity is 
expressly limited and at least twelve exceptions to the waiver 
are cited in the section itself. 
The plain, unequivocal, and mandatory language used by the 
legislature in the second paragraph of Section 63-30-3 excepts 
the activities of the "management of flood waters and the 
construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems" 
from the more general waivers of governmental immunity set 
forth elsewhere in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The 
grant of immunity is clear and explicit: 
"...governmental entities and their offi-
cers and employees are immune from suit for 
any injury or damage resulting from those 
activities. " [emphasis added]. 
There is no ambiguity in this language. There is nothing to 
support the contention that the language should be regarded as 
a mere definition of flood control activities as a governmental 
function which is then subject to less specific waiver 
provisions in the Act. 
The intent of the Utah Legislature in enacting the above 
grant of immunity for flood control activities could not be 
stated more clearly than it is in the language of the Act. 
There are many rules of statutory construction, but they all 
revolve around a single principle. That principle is that the 
courts are to find and uphold the intent of the legislature. 
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Johnson v. State Tax Commission, 17 U.2d 337, 411 P.2d 831 
(1966). This Court has stated that foundational rules require 
the Court to assume that each term of a statute was used 
advisedly and that it is the duty of the Court to give effect 
to every word, clause, and sentence of a legislative enact-
ment. Durfey v. Board of Education of Wayne County School 
District, 604 P.2d 280 (Utah, 1979); Grant v. Utah State Land 
Board, 26 U.2d 100, 485 P.2d 1035 (1971). 
In enacting the explicit grant of immunity "from suit for 
any injury or damage resulting from the management of flood 
waters and the construction, repair, and operation of flood and 
storm systems," the Utah legislature did not intend to enact 
language that is meaningless or a mere nullity. Thus, the 
specific grant of immunity for these activities should be held 
to supersede the more general and inconsistent waiver under 
Section 63-30-10. 
Even without consideration of the 1984 amendment to Section 
63-30-3 as discussed above, the provisions of Section 
63-30-10(1) preserves immunity to Salt Lake County from suit in 
this action. 
Section 63-30-10 generally waives immunity from suit for 
injuries caused by negligent acts of the employees of 
governmental entities. However, this waiver is specifically 
limited. Section 63-30-10 expressly retains immunity in 
numerous situations listed as exceptions, including those where 
the injury "arises out of the exercise or performance or the 
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function. 
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whether or not the discretion is abused." Section 
63-30-10(l)(a). 
Salt Lake County's role in the control of flood and storm 
waters for the benefit of the citizens residing in the County 
is based upon the authority provided by Section 17-8-5, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. This statute provides: 
In anticipation of and to provide for the 
carrying away and the safe disposal of 
natural storm and flood waters, the board 
of county commissioners may remove any 
obstacle from any natural channels within 
the County and the incorporated municipali-
ties in the County. For the same purpose, 
the board may plan for and construct new 
channels, storm sewers and drains to serve 
as though they were natural channels.... 
The board of commissioners may also provide 
for the maintenance, improvement and 
fencing of all such channels, including 
covering or replacement with buried 
conduits... . 
By this statute, the Utah Legislature authorizes counties 
to engage in flood and storm water control through the use and 
regulation of natural channels, as well as new channels to 
serve as though they were natural channels. The amount and 
type of flood control effort is left to the discretion of the 
board of county commissioners. The statute imposes no mandate 
or duty for any type or level of flood control, but only an 
authority to act which the board "may" exercise. 
In Board of Education of Granite School District v. Salt 
Lake County. 659 P.2d 1030 (Utah, 1983), the Court stated, 
"This Court assumes that the terms of a statute are used 
advisedly and should be given an interpretation and application 
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which is in accord with their usually accepted meanings." 
(Id., at 1035). A provision of a statute couched in permissive 
terms is generally regarded as discretionary unless the context 
clearly indicates otherwise. See 73 Am.Jur.2d "Statutes" 
Section 22. In Grant v. Utah State Land Board, supra, the 
Court applied the general rule stated above and found the word 
"may." in a statute pertaining to the land board, not to import 
certainty, but uncertainty; and thus, the reasonable deduction 
to be made was that the ordinary meaning of the term "may" was 
that one "may" or "may not" act. Similarly, the term "may" in 
Section 17-8-5 vests the board of county commissioners with 
discretion as to the amount or extent of flood and storm water 
management it will provide. 
In the present case. Salt Lake County acted pursuant to the 
discretionary authority granted by Section 17-8-5 in its 
efforts to remove obstacles from the natural channel of Big 
Cottonwood Creek. Plaintiff acknowledges in his complaint that 
these actions were part of the county1s flood control program 
and were taken in an attempt to correct and prevent potential 
flood problems in the area. 
Under Utah law, it is clear that the acts or omissions 
plaintiff complains of are discretionary functions. Little v. 
Utah Division of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah, 1983); 
White v. State. 579 P.2d 921 (Utah. 1978). In Little, this 
Court stated that Utah courts will look to federal court 
decisions for direction as to what is a discretionary function: 
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Utah's exceptions to waiver of govern-
mental immunity closely parallel those 
enumerated under 28 U.S.C. 2680(a) of the 
Federal Tort Claims Act. This Court has 
followed the lead of cases interpreting 
that act. Frank v. State, Utah. 613 P.2d 
517 (1980). Beginning with the two root 
cases of Dalehite v. United States. 346 
U.S. 15. 73 S.Ct. 956. 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953) 
and Indian Towing Co. v. United States. 350 
U.S. 61. 76 S.Ct. 122. 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955). 
the lines in federal cases have been 
consistently drawn between those functions 
ascribable to the policy making level and 
those to the operational level. State law 
has followed along analogous lines. [667 
P.2d at 51]. 
The landmark federal case dealing with discretionary 
functions is Dalehite v. United States. 346 U.S. 15 (1952). In 
Dahlehite. the U. S. Supreme Court recognized that a precise 
definition of the limits of discretion is impossible; however, 
it established a standard by which to measure challenged acts. 
The Court stated: 
It is unnecessary to define, apart from 
this case. precisely where discretion 
ends. It is enough to hold, as we do. that 
the "discretionary function or duty" that 
cannot form a basis for suit under the Tort 
Claims Act includes more than the initia-
tion of programs and activities. It also 
includes determinations made by executives 
or administrators in establishing plans, 
specifications or schedules of operations. 
Where there is room for policy judgment and 
decision there is discretion. It necessar-
ily follows that acts of subordinates in 
carrying out the operations of government 
in accordance with official directions can-
not be actionable. If it were not so, the 
protection of 2680(a) would fail at the 
time it would be needed, that is. when a 
subordinate performs or fails to perform a 
causal step, each action or nonaction being 
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directed by the superior, exercising, per-
haps abusing, discretion. [346 U.S. at 
35-36; emphasis added]. 
As this Court has noted, federal cases provide useful 
guidance in this area. That the discretionary function 
exception immunizes governmental entities from suits over 
flooding, see Spillway Marina. Inc. v. U.S.. 445 U.S. 876 (10th 
Cir. 1971); National Mfg. Co. v. U.S.. 210 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 
1954); Coates v. U.S.. 181 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950); Olson v. 
U.S.. 93 F.Supp. 150 (D.N.D. 1950); U.S. v. Gregory. 300 F.2d 
11 (10th Cir. 1962); Konecny v. U.S.. 368 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 
1967); and U.S. v. Ure. 225 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1955). 
In the present case. the actions of Salt Lake County 
alleged by plaintiff necessarily involved an exercise of 
judgment and constitute a discretionary function. Salt Lake 
County acted purusant to the discretionary authority granted by 
Section 17-8-5 in its efforts to remove obstacles from the 
natural channel of Big Cottonwood Creek as part of the county's 
flood control program. It is clear under both Utah and federal 
case law that the county's actions constitute the exercise and 
performance of a discretionary function. 
III. PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIRE-
MENTS OF SECTION 63-30-19 IS ALSO A BAR TO 
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION. 
Section 63-30-19. Utah Code Annotated 1953. as amended, 
provides: 
Undertaking required of plaintiff in 
action.--At the time of filing the action 
the plaintiff shall file an undertaking in 
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a sum fixed by the court, but in no case 
less than the sum of $300, conditioned upon 
payment by the plaintiff of taxable costs 
incurred by the governmental entity in the 
action if the plaintiff fails to prosecute 
the action or fails to recover judgment. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act has a number of 
procedural requirements which must be fully complied with 
before suit against a political subdivision can be allowed. 
See Roosendaal Construction and Mining Corp. v. Holman, 28 U.2d 
396, 503 P.2d 446 (1972); Scarborough v. Granite School Dist., 
531 P.2d 480 (Utah, 1975); Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 
(Utah, 1983). 
A review of the record in this case shows that at the time 
plaintiff filed this action in the lower court, and continuing 
to the time the action was dismissed, he failed to file an 
undertaking as required by Section 63-30-19. Plaintiff's 
failure to comply with this prerequisite in pursuing his claim 
bars his maintaining this action against Salt Lake County and 
constitutes proper grounds for dimissal of this action. 
IV. THE DOCTRINE OF INVERSE CONDEMNATION DOES NOT 
ESTABLISH A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER UTAH LAW, NOR 
HAS IMMUNITY BEEN WAIVED FOR INVERSE CONDEMNA-
TION CLAIMS UNDER THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMU-
NITY ACT. 
Plaintiff's amended complaint alleges a second cause of 
action based upon a theory of inverse condemnation. The lower 
court correctly dismissed this claim. 
This Court has on numerous occasions addressed the question 
whether Article I. Section 22 of the Utah Constitution can be 
the legal basis for a lawsuit. In a long line of cases, which 
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are not addressed in appellant's brief, this Court has 
consistently ruled that the doctrine of inverse condemnation 
pursuant to Section 22 does not establish a cause of action. 
Fairclouqh v. Salt Lake County, 10 U.2d 417, 354 P.2d 105 
(1960); Sprinqville Banking Co, v. Burton, 10 U.2d 100, 349 
P.2d 157 (1960); State v, Parker, 13 U.2d 65, 368 P.2d 585 
(1962); Holt v. Utah Road Comm., 30 U.2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286 
(1973); and Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah, 1975). 
In Fairclouqh, supra, this Court held that Section 22 of 
Article I was not self-executing with respect to an action 
against the State Road Commission for construction of a highway 
project which reduced the grade about 16 feet below the 
plaintiff's abutting property. The plaintiff alleged that the 
lowered grade diminished the number of lots into which the 
property could be subdivided, thereby reducing its value by 
$43,000.00. The suit sought damages or alternatively a writ of 
mandamus to compel the road commission to institute eminent 
domain proceedings to assess and adjudge damages. The 
defendant raised the defense of sovereign immunity. This Court 
held that Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, 
relating to condemnation, is not self-executing and does not 
authorize actions against the state without the state's 
consent. Citing Sprinqville, supra, as precedent, the Court 
stated: 
...consistently and historically we have 
ruled that the State may not be sued with-
out its consent; taken the view that Art. 
I, Sec. 22 of our Constitution is not self-
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executing, nor does it give consent to be 
sued, implied or otherwise; and that to 
secure such consent is a legislative 
matter, a principle recognized by the leg-
islature itself. Other states and federal 
courts have agreed, [citing authority] [Id. 
at 354 P.2d 106.] 
Quoting from Lynch v. U.S., 292 U.S. 571 (1934), the Utah 
Court stated: 
The sovereign's immunity from suit 
exists whatever the character of the pro-
ceeding or the source of the right sought 
to be enforced. It applies alike to causes 
arising under acts of Congress * * * and to 
those arising from violation of rights con-
ferred upon the citizen by the Constitu-
tion * * *. For immunity from suit is an 
attribute of sovereignty which may not be 
bartered away. rFairclough at 354 P.2d 
107; emphasis in Fairclough.] 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act preserves immunity 
except as immunity is specifically waived. Holt v. State Road 
Comm. , 30 U.2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286, 1288 (1973); Wilkinson v. 
State, 42 Utah 483. 134 Pac. 2626, 630 (1913). There has been 
no waiver of immunity for inverse condemnation claims. Walton 
v. State. 558 P.2d 609, 611 (Utah, 1976). This must be 
especially true of inverse condemnation claims arising out of 
the management of flood waters and other flood control 
activities because of the 1984 amendment to Section 63-30-3 
discussed above. 
In Holt v. Utah State Road Comm.. supra, this Court held 
that Section 63-30-6 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act did 
not provide a waiver for an action for damages for impairment 
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of access to property caused by a highway underpass, and held 
further that the act would be strictly construed, waiving 
immunity "only as clearly expressed therein." In Walton v. 
State Road Comm.. supra, this Court similarly held that a 
damage action for loss of access to a lot resulting from 
grading was barred by the Governmental Immunity Act. 
In Fairclouqh, supra, the Court said: 
Many times we have announced the 
principle. 
In Wilkinson v. State, 1913, 42 Utah 
at page 492, 134 P. at page 630, where Utah 
was sued for damages caused by flooding of 
land by State agents. Art. I, Sec. 22 then 
operative, Mr. Chief Justice Frick said: 
We have neither a statute nor a 
constitutional provision authoriz-
ing a suit against the state. * * 
* and in the absence of either 
express constitutional or statu-
tory authority an action against a 
sovereign state cannot be main-
tained * * * . 
State by State Road Commission v. 
Fourth District Court, 1937, supra, 94 Utah 
at page 389, 78 P.2d at page 504, although 
conceding that Art. I, Sec. 22 guaranteed 
that property was not to be taken or damaged 
for public use without just compensation, 
nonetheless recognized the rule that 
statewise: 
The State cannot be sued unless 
it has given its consent or has 
waived it immunity * * *. [354 
P.2d 107J. 
Although plaintiff cites several cases from other states in 
support of his argument, all of these cases are clearly incon-
sistent with the well established precedents of this Court. 
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Even if actions for inverse condemnation were allowed under 
Utah law. Salt Lake County's actions in removing potentially 
hazardous obstacles from the natural channel of Big Cottonwood 
Creek would be privileged under the express authority granted 
by Section 17-8-5. Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
discussed above. The actions taken by the County in removing 
plaintiff's bridges and other materials were done for reasons 
of public safety in anticipation of potential flooding and were 
a proper exercise of the County's statutory authority. 
Salt Lake County takes strong exception to the plaintiff's 
characterization of facts set forth on page 21 of his brief. 
Plaintiff's assertion of "essentially what has happened in this 
case" goes too far. There has been no allegation that the 
County made a decision to eliminate a bend in the stream, nor 
has there been any allegation that the County took its 
machinery and plowed through plaintiff's home and yard. If 
Salt Lake County were to decide to change the course of the 
stream to an extent that it would then flow in a new channel 
through private property, the County would first acquire the 
property, as it routinely does, through purchase or 
condemnation proceedings. In this case. Salt Lake County 
admits to removing various materials from the natural channel 
of Big Cottonwood Creek for the purpose of controlling storm 
and flood waters. The County's removal of such obstacles was 
clearly within its statutory authority under Section 17-8-5, 
supra. 
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In summary, the lower court properly dismissed plaintiff's 
second cause of action based upon the theory of inverse condem-
nation alleged in the amended complaint. This Court has con-
sistently and historically held that Article I, Section 22 of 
the Utah Constitution is not self-executing and does not estab-
lish a cause of action. This Court has also consistently held 
that there has been no waiver of immunity for inverse condemna-
tion claims under the provisions of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court correctly determined that Salt Lake County 
is immune from suit in this action under the provisions of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act and the applicable case law 
established by this Court. The two orders entered by the lower 
court dismissing this action should therefore be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this
 v ?fl/n day of April, 1986. 
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ORDINANCE NO. $/ 7 DATE Q//0,/> V, / ? ? 2 ^ 
AN ORDINANCE AMENDING ALL OF TITLE VII OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY BY REPEALING THAT ORDINANCE ENTITLED "AN ORD-
NANCE PERTAINING TO FLOOD CONTROL AND STORM DRAINAGE: ESTABLISHING 
THE LOCATION AND SIZES OF STORM DRAIN PIPELINES TO CONVEY NATURAL 
STORM DRAINAGE WATERS TO PROTECT PROPERTY FROM FLOODING"; AND BY 
REPEALING CHAPTERS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 AND 6 AS THOSE CHAPTERS ARE PRE-
SENTLY WRITTEN; AND BY ENACTING NEW CHAPTERS 1,2, 3,4, 5, 6, 7, 
8, AND 9 TO PROVIDE A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR THE REGULATION AND 
CONTROL OF NATURAL STORM AND FLOOD WATERS WITHIN SALT LAKE COUNTY 
AND TO PROVIDE FOR THE PROTECTION AND ENHANCEMENT OF WATER QUALITY 
WITHIN THE NATURAL CHANNELS OF SALT LAKE COUNTY. 
The Board of County Commissioners for the County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah, ordains as follows: 
SECTION I. That Title VII of the Revised Ordinances of 
Salt Lake County, consisting of the following chapters, to-wit: An 
unnumbered chapter entitled "An Ordinance Pertaining to Flood Con-
trol and Storm Drainage: Establishing the Location and Sizes of 
Storm Drain Pipelines to Convey Natural Storm Drainage Waters to 
Protect Property from Flooding"; Chapter 1, "Reserve Fund for Flood 
Control and Storm Drainage Systems"; Chapter 2, "Department of Storm 
Drainage and Flood Control"; Chapter 3, "Use of Flood Control Faci-
lities"; Chapter 4, "Drainage of Subsurface Water"; Chapter 5, "Water 
Quality and Water Pollution Control"; and Chapter 6, "Storm Drain-
age and Flood Control Development"; be, and hereby is, repealed. 
SECTION II. That Title VII of the Revised Ordinances of 
Salt Lake County be enacted as follows: (Chapters 1-9, attached). 
SECTION in. Said ordinances shall take effect fifteen (15) 
days after the date of its passage and upon its publication with 
the names of the Board of Commissioners voting for and against 
the same, for at least one publication in some newspaper published 
in and having general circulation within Salt Lake County. 
Addendum 
APPROVED and ADOPTED this 
ATTEST: 
WT STERLING EVANS" 
Salt Lake County Clerk 
_/ day of^tfyrytd 1982, 
tr 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By. UyVTU/ 
D. MICHAEL STEWART, Chairman 
Commissioner Stewart voted V,^ / 
Commissioner Barker voted */,'../ 
Commissioner Shimizu voted- ^//^ y 
•APPROVED AS TO FORM* 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
Satt Lake County Attorney 
FLOOD CONTROL, STORM DRAINAGE AND WATER QUALITY ORDINANCE 
Title VII 
FLOOD CONTROL, STORM DRAINAGE AND WATER QUALITY ORDINANCE 
Chapter 1 . Division of Flood Control and Water Quality 
Chapter 2. Flood Control Facilities and Regulation Thereof 
Chapter 3. Drainage of Subsurface Water 
Chapter 4. Water Quality Management 
Chapter 5. Storm Drainage and Flood Control Development 
Chapter 6. Reserve Fund for Flood Control, Storm Drainage 
and Water Quality Purposes 
Chapter 7. Budgeting 
Chapter 8. Bonds or Sureties 
Chapter 9. Penalties 
7-2-4—7-2-5 
Sec. 7-2-4. Obstruction of or Damage to Facilities. It shall be un-
lawful for any person, f i rm, municipality, or d is t r ic t to place or cause to 
be placed in the channel, bed, or bank of any r i ve r , stream, wash, or 
other natural drain or within or upon any flood control channel, resevoir, 
detention basin, debris basin, spreading ground or other property over 
which the County has an interest, matter of any kind that may operate to 
impede, re tard , or change the normal direction of the flow of f lood, storm 
or other waters, or that may catch or collect debris carried by such 
waters, or that may be carried down stream by such waters to the damage 
and detriment of adjacent private or public proper ty , or that may degrade 
the quality of the water, without f i r s t obtaining a wr i t ten permit for such 
placement from the Director of the Division. 
Sec. 7-2-5. Included Facilities. The following faci l i t ies, wherever 
located in the County, including open channel sections and sections in con-
du i t , are declared to be part of the storm drainage and flood control sys-
tem and are subject to the provisions of this chapter relating to such faci-


































The Jordan River 
City Creek 
Red Butte Creek 
Emigration Creek 
Parley's Canyon Creek 
Mountain Dell Canyon Creek 
Lamb's Canyon Creek 
Mill Creek 
Neff's Creek 
Big Cottonwood Creek 
Little Cottonwood Creek 
Dry Creek from Bell's Canyon Reservoir to Jordan River 
Big Willow Creek 
Little Willow Creek 
Corner Creek 
Beef Hollow Creek Downstream from 
Wood Hollow Creek Downstream from 
Rose Creek 





Harker's Canyon Creek 
Coon Canyon Creek 
Provo Reservoir Canal 
Utah Lake Distr ibut ing Company Canal 
Utah and Salt Lake Canal 
South Jordan Canal 




Camp Williams Boundary 
Camp Williams Boundary 
7-2-5 
(34) C-7 Ditch 
(35) Lee Creek 
(36) 8000 West Drain - Utah and Salt Lake Canal to C-7 Ditch 
(37) Kearns-Chesterfield Drain-Utah and Salt Lake Canal to Jordan 
River including Decker Lake 
(38) Lee Drain - Lee Drain Pump Station to Lee Creek 
(39) Goggin Drain 1300 South to Great Salt Lake 
(40) Surplus Canal 
(41) 2700 West Drain-North Jordan Canal to 1-215 Drain 
(42) 1-215 Drain - 4700 South to 4100 South and 2700 West Drain 
to Decker Lake 
(43) 4100 South Drain - 3200 West to Jordan River 
(44) 4700 South Drains - South Jordan Canal to 1-215 Drain and 
North Jordan Canal to Jordan River 
(45) 3200 West Drain - 4700 South to 4100 South 
(46) 5400 South Drain - Utah and Salt Lake Canal to Jordan River 
(47) City Drain, West Branch from CWA 2 Drain to Sewage Canal 
(48) Sewage Canal from City Drain to Great Salt Lake 
(49) CWA 2 Drain from CWA 1 Drain to West Branch City Drain 
(50) CWA 3 Drain from Brighton Canal Extension to CWA 2 Drain 
(51) CWA 1 Drain from Roper Yard to CWA 2 Drain 
(52) 4th Avenue Drain - Virginia Street to City Creek 
(53) 8th South Drain - East High School Detention Basin to 
Jordan River 
(54) 7200 South Drain 
(55) 9000 South Drain 
(56) The Upper Canal 
(57) Salt Lake City Canal to Red Butte Creek 
(58) East Jordan Canal 
(59) East Jordan Canal Extension 
(60) Draper Irr igat ion Canal 
(61) Sandy Irr igat ion Canal 
(62) Union Jordan North and 
Creek to Jordan River 
(63) Brown and Sanford Ditch 
East Jordan Canal to Jordan River 
Sandy Irr igat ion Canal to Jordan River 
South Ditches from Little Cottonwood 
If not owned by the County, the r ights of the County in and to ca-
nals and storm drains specified above are limited to those included in speci-
f ic agreements for their use with the owners of such facil i t ies. 
The provisions of this chapter shall also apply to the following classes 
of faci l i t ies: 
(a) All collection storm drains and subsurface collection systems in 
stalled in dedicated easements and other easements in which the County 
has a legal interest, and located in the unincorporated County area. 
(b ) All collection storm drains and subsurface collection systems in -
stalled in dedicated easements and located in the incorporated areas of the 
County through contracts and agreements specifically outl ining duties and 
responsibilit ies of the city and County on each fac i l i ty . 
